This paper re-evaluates the security of a chaotic image encryption algorithm called MCKBA/ HCKBA and finds that it can be broken efficiently with two known plain-images and the corresponding cipher-images. In addition, it is reported that a previously proposed breaking on MCKBA/HCKBA can be further improved by reducing the number of chosen plain-images from four to two. The two attacks are both based on the properties of solving a composite function involving the carry bit, which is composed of the modulo addition and the bitwise OR operations. Both rigorous theoretical analysis and detailed experimental results are provided.
Introduction
The subtle similarities between chaos and cryptography make chaos considered as a special way to design secure and efficient encryption schemes . Meanwhile, some cryptanalysis work demonstrated that some chaos-based encryption schemes are vulnerable to various conventional attacks from the viewpoint of modern cryptology [Li et al., 2004; Xiao et al., 2006; Solak et al., 2010a,b] . In addition, some specific security flaws of chaos-based encryption schemes were reported [Zhou & Au, 2011; Chen et al., 2012] . [Álvarez & Li, 2006] concluded some general approaches to evaluating security of chaosbased encryption schemes.
Due to the simplicity and low computation complexity of bitwise exclusive OR operation and modulo addition, they are widely used in traditional text encryption schemes and hash functions. Possible generation of carry bit by the modulo addition makes the two operations are neither identical nor interchangeable. Some properties existing in multi-round combination of the two basic operations were derived to facilitate differential attacks on some traditional text encryption schemes or searching collision of hash functions [Paul & Preneel, 2005; Wang et al., 2005] . Among many chaos-based encryption schemes, the two operations are the basic involved (even only) substitution functions. In , , [Li et al., 2008] , and [Li et al., 2009] , the following properties about n-bit integers α, β, γ, x, y were found to support or enhance the proposed attacks on the corresponding encryption schemes in turn.
• If α ⊕ β = 2 n − 1, then equation (α ⊕ x) = (β ⊕ x) γ has unique solution modulo 2 n−1 , where (a b) = (a + b) mod 2 n ; • Equation |(α ⊕ β) − (β ⊕ γ)| = |(α ⊕β) − (β ⊕γ)| always exists;
• If α ⊕ β = γ, then |α − β| ≤ γ;
• If (((x α) ⊕ β) γ) ≡ x ⊕ y, then y ≡ β (mod 2 n−1 ).
In 2000, Yen et al. proposed a chaotic key-based algorithm (CKBA) by encrypting each pixel of a plain-image by four possible operations: XORing or XNORing it with one of two predefined sub-keys. The exerted operation is determined by a pseudo-random number sequence (PRNS) generated by iterating the logistic map [Yen & Guo, 2000] . In 2002, S. Li et al. broke CKBA with only one known/chosen-image in [Li & Zheng, 2002] . In 2005, Socek et al. proposed an enhanced version of CKBA (ECKBA) employing the following four methods: 1) replacing the logistic map with a piecewise linear chaotic map (PWLCM); 2) increasing the bit length of secret key to 128; 3) adding a modulo addition and an XOR operation; 4) running all the basic encryption functions multiple times. To achieve a much better balance between encryption load and security of high level, in 2007 Rao et al. proposed a modified version of CKBA (MCKBA) in [Rao & Gangadhar, 2007] by employing a modular addition operation like [Socek et al., 2005] . To further enhance the security of MCKBA against brute-force attack, in 2010 Gangadhar et al. replaced the logistic map with a simple hyperchaos generator proposed in [Takahashi et al., 2004] and names the algorithm HCKBA (Hyper Chaotic-Key Based Algorithm) [Gangadhar & Rao, 2010] . Since the two schemes MCKBA and HCKBA share the same structure, [Li et al., 2011] analyzed them together and reported the following points:
• Equivalent secret key of MCKBA/HCKBA can be obtained from four pairs of chosen-plaintexts;
• Encryption result of MCKBA/HCKBA is not sensitive to changes of plain-image;
• Encryption result of MCKBA is not sensitive to changes of two sub-keys.
• The lower bound on the number of queries (α, β) to solve unknown variable x in equation
in terms of modulo 2 n−1 is 3 if n ≥ 4.
This paper re-evaluates the security of MCKBA/HCKBA and reports the following points: 1) some properties of Eq. (1) are provided to support practical approaches to solving Eq. (1); 2) MCKBA/HCKBA can be efficiently broken with two known-plaintexts; 3) the chosen-plaintext attack proposed in [Li et al., 2011] can be further improved and the number of required chosen-plaintexts is only two.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The image encryption algorithm under study is briefly introduced in Sec. 2. A known-plaintext attack and an improved chosen-plaintext attack on the algorithm is presented in Sec. 3 with experimental results. The last section concludes this paper.
The Chaotic Image Encryption Algorithm Under Study
The encryption object of MCKBA is a gray-scale image of size M × N (width×height), which is scanned in the raster order and represented as a one dimensional sequence I = {I(i)} M N −1 i=0
. Then, a binary sequence
is constructed, where
is generated, where
is not a multiple of n, the sequence I b is padded with some zero bits. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that n can divide (8M N ) in this paper. MCKBA operates on the intermediate sequence J and obtains
, where
Based on the above preliminary introduction, MCKBA is described with the following four parts 1 .
• The secret key: Two random numbers key 1 , key 2 ∈ {0, · · · , 2 n − 1}, and the initial condition x(0) ∈ (0, 1) of the logistic map
where n−1 j=0 (key 1,j ⊕ key 2,j ) = n/2 , key 1 = n−1 j=0 key 1,j · 2 j , key 2 = n−1 j=0 key 2,j · 2 j , and ⊕ denotes the eXclusive OR (XOR) operation.
• Initialization: Run Eq. (2) iteratively to generate a sequence {x(k)} M N/(2n)−1 k=0
and derive a pseudorandom binary sequence (PRBS), {b(l)} 16M N/n−1 l=0
, from the 32-bit binary representation of elements of the sequence, namely
where B(k) = 2 · b(2k) + b(2k + 1), and a b = a ⊕ b = a ⊕b.
• Decryption: The decryption procedure is similar to that of the encryption except that Eq. (3) is replaced by
where a−b = (a − b + 2 n ) mod 2 n .
Cryptanalysis
Assume that two plain-images and the corresponding cipher-images encrypted with the same secret key are available, and let
denote the corresponding intermediate sequences, respectively. Then, one can assure that the two sequences and the corresponding encrypted results
No matter what the value of B(k) is, the above equation can be represented in the form of Eq. (1). In this section, we first present some properties of the kernel function (1) on obtaining its solution and then illustrate how to obtain an equivalent secret key of MCKBA/HCKBA with two known plain-images and two chosen plain-images, respectively.
Some properties of the kernel function
Property 1. Equivalent form of Eq.
(1)
can be represented as an iteration form
where
These notations are the same hereinafter.).
Proof. Set c 0 = 0, one can calculate c i+1 from c i and α i via
for i = 0 ∼ n − 2. So, c i+1 denote the carry bit generated by x and α in the i-th bit plane. Setc 0 = 0, one can then obtainc
Similarly,c i+1 denote the carry bit generated by x and β in the i-th bit plane. Obviously,
Then, the (i + 1)-th bit plane of Eq. (6) can be represented as
where i = 0 ∼ n − 2. So,ỹ i can be easily calculated iteratively according to Eq. (7) for i = 0 ∼ n − 2, which can also be done via checking Table 1 listing the values ofỹ i+1 under all possible different values of α i , β i ,ỹ i , x i , and c i . Table 1 . The values ofỹ i+1 corresponding to the values of α i , β i ,ỹ i , x i , and c i .
Property 2. Given (α i , β i ,ỹ i ,ỹ i+1 ), no information about x i , c i andc i can be obtained (Note that c 0 and c 0 are excluded since they are pre-defined constants.) if and only if (4α i + 2β i +ỹ i ) ∈ {0, 6}.
Proof. Since only the data in the 0, 6-th column (zero-based) of Table 1 are identical, it is impossible to obtain any information about
Proof. Only under the cases shown in the 1, 7-th column of Table 1 ,
It is easy to verify that x i = α i ⊕ỹ i+1 in terms of value.
Proof. Only under the cases shown in the 3, 5-th column of Table 1 , c i can be determined by (α i , β i ,ỹ i ,ỹ i+1 ) without knowledge of x i . It is easy to verify that c i = β i ⊕ỹ i+1 in terms of value. Then, one can obtaiñ
Property 5. Given (α i , β i ,ỹ i ,ỹ i+1 ), the scope of the unknown bits x i , c i can be narrowed via
if and only if (4α i + 2β i +ỹ i ) ∈ {2, 4}.
Proof. Referring to the cases shown in the 2, 4-th column of Table 1 , the scope of (x i , c i ) can be narrowed according to value ofỹ i+1 . It is easy to obtain Eq. (9) from Table 1 . Therefore, the "if" part of the property is proven. Note that the number of possible values of (4α i + 2β i +ỹ i ) is only eight, and the sufficient and necessary conditions on obtaining different information on x i and c i under other six cases have been presented. Therefore, the "only if" part of the property is also proven.
Property 6. If (α i−1 ⊕ β i−1 ) = 1 andỹ i = 1, one has c i = α i−1 , where i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n − 2}.
Proof. When (α i−1 , β i−1 ) = (1, 0) andỹ i = 1, one can get c i = 1 from Eq. (7) no matter the value of x i−1 . Similarly, one has c i = 0 when (α i−1 , β i−1 ) = (0, 1) andỹ i = 1. So, the property is proven.
Property 7. Given α, β,ỹ, some bits among the (n−1) least significant bits of x in Eq. (6) can be determined from the least significant bit to the most significant one.
Proof. The concrete approaches to solving Eq. (1) and determining the carry bits can be divided into the following two classes of operations.
• Obtaining information on x 0 and c 1 : According to how much information on x 0 and c 1 can be obtained, (α 0 , β 0 ,ỹ 0 ) is further classified as the following two cases. (a) (4α 0 + 2β 0 +ỹ 0 ) ∈ {0, 6}: Referring to Property 2, x 0 can not be determined in this case, but one can obtain c 1 = 0 if α 0 = 0. (b) (4α 0 + 2β 0 +ỹ 0 ) ∈ {2, 4}: As c 0 = 0, one can obtain
from Eq. (9). Then, one can further obtain
• Obtaining information on x i , c i and c i+1 for i = 1 ∼ n − 2: According to how much information on x i , c i and c i+1 can be obtained by checking (α i , β i ,ỹ i ) and the obtained information on c i for i = 1 ∼ n − 2 in order, (α i , β i ,ỹ i ) is categorized as the following four cases 2 . (a) (4α i + 2β i +ỹ i ) ∈ {0, 6}: Referring to Property 2, no information on x can be determined in this case.
The value of c i+1 can be determined by Eq. (8) if
One has
from Property 3. If c i has been determined, one can obtain c i+1 . Even c i is still unknown, one can confirm c i+1 by Eq. (8) if (α i + x i ) = 0 or (α i + x i ) = 2 is known. (c) (4α i + 2β i +ỹ i ) ∈ {2, 4}: If c i has been determined, based on Property 5 one can obtain
and further confirm the value of c i+1 . (d) (4α i + 2β i +ỹ i ) ∈ {3, 5}: Referring to Property 4, one can obtain c i = β i ⊕ỹ i+1 .
Known-plaintext attack
Known-plaintext attack is one of the classic attack models where the attacker (or cryptanalyst) can access both some plaintexts and the corresponding encryption results encrypted with the same secret key. In [Gangadhar & Rao, 2010, Sec. 3.2] , the original authors claimed that HCKBA has strong vulnerability against known-plaintext attack. However, we found MCKBA/HCKBA is very weak against the attack, which is supported by the properties of Eq. (1) shown in the previous subsection.
Under the scenario of known-plaintext attack, breaking MCKBA/HCKBA is to determine some information of its equivalent secret key, key1, key2 and {B(k)} 8M N/n−1 k=0
, by solving Eq. (5) and utilizing some properties of MCKBA/HCKBA. From Property 7, one can see that some bits of key1 and key2 can be obtained from Eq. (5) by identifying and combining the known bits belonging to the same number, which is described by the following steps.
• Step 1): Set K = {key(0), key(1), · · · , key(8M N/n − 1)}. Delete some elements of K to assure that every pair of elements of K has at least one different confirmed bit.
• Step 2): Search for the first two elements in K whose number of confirmed bits are most but the confirmed bits of the two elements are not all the same. Let Seed(0) and Seed(1) denote the two seed elements and delete them from K.
• Step 3): Check each element of K in turn and do the following two operations if it has one confirmed bit which is different from that of Seed(i): 1) update Seed(1 − i) by combining all the confirmed bits of the element into that of Seed(1 − i); 2) delete the element from K, where i ∈ {0, 1}.
• Step 4): Repeat
Step 3) iteratively till the numbers of confirmed bits of Seed(0) and Seed(1) are not increased in the whole step.
• Step 5): Terminate the whole search operation when all bits of Seed(0) and Seed(1) are confirmed bits; otherwise repeat
Step 2) through Step 4) till the cardinality of K is less than 2.
Let us study the probability on obtaining x i and c i with one pair of α, β andỹ under assumption that α, β and x distributes over {0, · · · , 2 n − 1} uniformly. First, one has P rob(c 0 = 1) = 0 and P rob(c i = 1) = 3 4 P rob(c i−1 = 1) + 1 4 P rob(c i−1 = 0) for i = 1 ∼ n − 1. Solve the above iteration function, one can obtain P rob(c i = 1) = 2 i −1 2 i+1 . Obviously, one has P rob(ỹ 0 = 0) = 1. Observe Table 1 , one can see that the value ofỹ i is determined by the values of y i−1 , c i−1 , x i−1 , α i−1 and β i−1 for i = 1 ∼ n − 1. Considering all possible cases, one has
for i = 1 ∼ n − 1. Solve the iteration function, one can obtain
From the proof of Property 7, one can first calculate P rob
for i = 2 ∼ n − 1, where P rob[a] denotes the probability that the bit a can be confirmed. Finally, one has P rob[x 0 ] = 1 2 and
for i = 1 ∼ n − 2. Incorporate Eq. (14) and Eq. (15) into Eq. (16), one can obtain that P rob[x 0 ] = 1 2 , P rob[x 1 ] = 0.4062, P rob[x 2 ] = 0.3818, and P rob[x i ] ≈ 0.37 for i ≥ 3. Now, one can assure that key1 i and key2 i can not be confirmed definitely with a probability smaller than or equal to (1 − 0.37) n 0 = 0.63 n 0 and 0.63 (8M N/n−n 0 ) respectively, where n 0 is cardinality of the set {k|B(k) ∈ {2, 3}, k = 0 ∼ 8M N/n − 1}. Note that confirmation of the bits of x in Eq. (1) is determined by α, β, and the used unknown variable x, and no any bit can be confirmed under some cases (See the examples shown in Table 2 ). In addition, as for plaintext chose from natural images, α follows Gaussian distribution. But, we can still believe that the set {key1, key2} can be reconstructed in a high probability since the values of n 0 and 8M N/n − n 0 are both very large in general. Table 2 . The number of confirmed bits of x in Eq. (1) under some sets of (α, β,ỹ) when n = 8, whereỹ is determined by (α, β, x) via Eq. (1). Referring to Proposition 1 and Eq. (3), one can obtain the scope of B(k),
for k = 0 ∼ 8M N/n − 1.
Proposition 1. Assume that a and x are both n-bit integers and n ∈ Z + , ((a x) ⊕ x) has the same parity as a and ((a x) x) has opposite parity as a.
Proof. Existence of four equations
is independent of x 0 , so the proposition is proved.
Proposition 2. Assume that a and x are both n-bit integers, n ∈ Z + , one has the following two equations
Proof. See the proof of Proposition 1 in [Li et al., 2011] .
According to the pre-defined condition key1 = key2, there are only two possible combinations of key1 and key2. Let (key1 * , key2 * ) denote the searched version of (key1, key2). Proposition 2 illustrates that the unknown most significant bit of key1 * = n−1 j=0 key1 * j · 2 j and key2 * = n−1 j=0 key1 * j · 2 j has no influence on decryption of MCKBA/HCKBA. Then, one can further obtain the approximate value of B(k), B * (k), and the n − 1 least significant bits of key1 and key2 by the following two different ways:
Note that Eq. (17) makes only two conditions in Eq. (18) need being verified. Obviously, one can assure that
for k = 0 ∼ 8M N/n − 1. Then, the value of B(k) can be obtained by setting
can work together as equivalent secret key of MCKBA/HCKBA due to that (key1, key2, B(k)) = (a, b, c) and (key1, key2, B(k)) = (b, a, (c + 2) mod 4) are equivalent for Eq. (4). Now, let's study the success probability of the above two methods. The success of the method W1) depends on existence of one of the eight condition in Eq. (18). As F (x, α, y) = 0 if and only if G(x, α, y ⊕ (2 n − 1)) = 0, only one of the two functions need being studed. Obviously,
So, B(k) can not be confirmed by Eq. (18) when J 1 (k) ∈ {0, 2 n−1 } and J 2 (k) ∈ {0, 2 n−1 } exist at the same time. It is very hard to derive the probability for other cases theoretically. Instead, we calculate the probability that F (x 1 , α, y) = F (x 2 , α, y) = 0 via simulation, where
x 1 = n−1 j=0 x 1,j · 2 j , x 2 = n−1 j=0 x 2,j · 2 j . Assume key1, key2 distributes uniformly, the distribution of probability F (key1, α, y) = F (key2, α, y) = 0 under different values of α and some values of n is shown in Fig. 1 . The success of the method W2) can be analyzed as follows. Assume key1, key2 distributes uniformly, one can get the probability that at least one bit (exclude the most significant bit) of key(k) satisfy s(k, i) = 1 and one condition of Eq. (19) is P rob [Eq. (19) 
From the above analysis, one can see that B(k), k = 0 ∼ 8M N/n − 1, can be determined with a probability larger than 1 − 3 4
n−1 when α, β and x in Eq. (1) distributes uniformly. Although pixels of natural images follow Gaussian distribution, and J 1 (k) and J 2 (k) in Eq. (5) do not distribute uniformly, we still can believe that the success probability of this method is very high since only one bit satisfying the conditions in Eq. (19) is needed, especially when n is relatively large.
To verify the real performance of the above analysis, a number of experiments are carried out on some plain-images of size 512 × 512 with the method W1) when n = 32. When x 0 = 319684607/2 32 , key 1 = 3835288501, and key 2 = 1437224678. Two known plain-images "Peppers" and "Baboon", and the corresponding cipher-images are adopted. Equivalent key key1 * , key2 * and {B * (k)} 8M N/n−1 k=0 is used to decrypt another cipher-image shown in Fig. 2a ) and the recovered result is shown in Fig. 2b) , which is identical with the original version. From the experiment, we found that only a little pixels (no more than ten pixels for plain-image of size 512 × 512) are not recovered correctly when n ≤ 28. This agree with our expectation as the probability that none of condition of Eq. (18) 
Chosen-plaintext attack
Chosen-plaintext attack is an enhanced version of known-plaintext attack, where the plaintext can be chosen arbitrarily to obtain the information about the secret key in a more efficient way. In this subsection, the chosen-plaintext attack on MCKBA/HCKBA is briefly introduced due to the following two points: 1) the known-plaintext attack on MCKBA/HCKBA works well in a relatively high probability and the chosen-plaintext version can improve its performance a little; 2) the underlying theorem supporting the attack proposed in [Li et al., 2011, Theorem 1] is not right and corrected in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. Assume that α, β, x are all n-bit integers, then a lower bound on the number of queries (α, β) to solve Eq. (1) in terms of modulo 2 n−1 for any x is 1 if n = 2; 2 if n > 2.
Proof. When n = 2, one can obtain x 0 =ỹ 1 by choosing (α 0 , β 0 ) = (1, 0). When n > 2,ỹ 1 may be equal to zero or one no matter what (α 0 , β 0 ) is, which means that it is impossible to satisfy the condition of Property 3 for any x. So, we have to resort to another query (α , β ). Let α i , β i , y i ,ỹ i and c i denote the counterparts of α i , β i , y i ,ỹ i , and c i corresponding to (α , β ). Given a set of (α i+k , β i+k ) and (α i+k , β i+k ), one can obtain (c i+k+1 ,ỹ i+k+1 ) and (c i+k+1 ,ỹ i+k+1 ) from (c i+k ,ỹ i+k ) and (c i+k ,ỹ i+k ), respectively, where i, k are non-negative integers. Let arrows of plain head and "V-back" head denote x i+k = 0 and x i+k = 1, respectively, Fig. 3 illustrates the mapping relationship between (c i+k ,ỹ i+k , c i+k ,ỹ i+k ) and (c i+k+1 ,ỹ i+k+1 , c i+k+1 ,ỹ i+k+1 ) for a given (α i+k , β i+k , α i+k , β i+k ), where k = 0, 1. Since (c 0 ,ỹ 0 , c 0 ,ỹ 0 ) ≡ (0, 0, 0, 0), the dashed arrows in Fig. 3 describe operations of Eq. (6) in the two least significant bit planes corresponding to two sets of (α, β). Note that the data in the third column is exactly the same as the first one. Therefore, Fig. 3 demonstrates operations of Eq. (6) under all different bit levels if the variable i goes through 2 · t, where t = 0 ∼ n/2 and i + k ≤ n − 1. Referring to Fig. 3 , it can be easily verified that 1 ∈ {y i , y i } is always satisfied, which means that x i can be derived from Table 1 .
Under scenario of chosen-plaintext attack, one may make the plaintext satisfy that at least one pair of elements in {(J 1 (k), J 2 (k)) | B(k) ∈ {0, 1}} whose i-th bit plane satisfy the condition of Property 3. The same case exists for {(J 1 (k), J 2 (k)) | B(k) ∈ {2, 3}}. The expected chosen-plaintext can be obtained in a high probability by assigning (J 1 (k), J 2 (k)) with one of the two sets of number given in Corollary 3.1 randomly. Compared with the known-plaintext attack, the chosen-plaintext attack has the following two superior performances: 1) the set {key1, key2} can be reconstructed with much less complexity and much higher degree of accuracy; 2) the bits of key(k) can be confirmed with a little higher probability. and checking the correspondingỹ = y ⊕ α ⊕ β.
Proof. The proof is straightforward and therefore omitted.
Conclusion
In this paper, the security of the image encryption algorithm MCKBA/HCKBA has been restudied in detail. Based on some properties of a composite function composed of the modulo addition and the XOR operation, a known-plaintext attack and an improved chosen-plaintext attack were provided to determine an equivalent secret key of MCKBA/HCKBA. The cryptanalysis provided in this paper sheds some light on breaking other encryption schemes based on multiple combination of the modulo addition and XOR operations.
